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BY HILARY PUTNAM, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
I urge first that mathematics should be interpreted realist- 
ically.and objectively. But unfortunately, belief in the object- 
ivity of mathematics has generally gone along with belief that 
“mathematical objects” have an unconditional and super-physical 
reality, and with the idea that mathematical knowledge is strictly 
a priori. But actually, the criterion of truth in mathematics 
is the success of its ideas in practice; mathematical knowledge 
is corrigible and not absolute; thus it resembles empirical 
knowledge in many respects. 
Superficially, the only method allowed in mathematics might 
seem to consist in deriving conclusions from axioms which have 
been fixed once and for all. But actually, quasi-empirical 
methods might be used successfully in mathematics. One might 
well ask why deductions from principles that are (more or less) 
self-evident should not be supplemented by hypotheses which are 
“evident” because they have been confirmed by mathematical 
“experiments”. Why not use both deductive proof and confirmation 
by mathematical “experiment” in the search for truth? 
Indeed, this seems almost necessary. All the statements 
(e.g., about number theory) that can be proved from the axioms 
form a recursively enumerable set, whereas Glldel’s Theorem shows 
that the set of truths of elementary number theory is not recur- 
sively enumerable. Hence there must be “synthetic” truths in 
number theory, and a refusal to use quasi-empirical methods debars 
us from ever finding a single one of them. 
Actually, mathematicians have been using quasi-empirical 
and even empirical methods all along. Thus, consider the basic 
postulate that there is a one-to-one order-preserving corres- 
pondence between the points on a straight line and the real 
numbers. On this all of analytical geometry and hence the 
topological theory of manifolds is founded. The Greeks could 
not establish this correspondence because they were unable to 
generalize the notion of “number” suitably. The correspondence 
was accepted by Descartes not on the basis of any construction 
of the reals from the rationals, but rather because the geometric 
evidence was so strong for it! 
Indeed, after this correspondence principle had demonstrated 
its fertility in physics as well as mathematics, we could hardly 
have been persuaded to abandon it even if contradictions had 
turned up, although we would certainly have done something to 
remove the contradictions. 
The same story repeats itself with the calculus. If the 
epsilon-delta methods had not been discovered, then infinitesmals 
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would have been postulated entities (just as "imaginary" numbers 
were for a long time). If the calculus had not been "justified" 
Weierstrass style, it would have been "justified" anyway. 
A more recent example is provided by Zermelo's Axiom of Choice. 
In his famous 1908 paper [Cll, pp. 183-981 Zermelo defends his 
axiom against the critics of his 1904 paper. Peano, in particular, 
had pointed out that the axiom appeared to be independent of those 
in Peano's Formulaire [C25] and had gone on to suggest that 
Zermelo's proof of the proposition that every set can be well- 
ordered was, therefore, no proof at all, since it rested on the 
"unproved" assertion of the Axiom of Choice. Here is Zermelo's 
reply [Cll, p. 1871: 
First, how does Peano arrive at his own 
fundamental principles and justify their 
inclusion in the Formulaire since, after all, 
he cannot prove them either? . ..This axiom 
(of choice), even though it was never form- 
ulated in textbook style, has frequently been 
used, and successfully at that, in the most 
diverse fields of mathematics, especially in 
set theory, by Dedekind, Cantor, F. Bernstein, 
Schoenflies, J. KUnig, and others... Such 
widespread use of a principle can be explained 
only by its self-evidence which, of course, 
must not be confused with its provability. 
No matter if this self-evidence is to a certain 
degree subjective -- it is surely a necessary 
source of mathematical principles, even if it is 
not a tool of mathematical proofs... The ques- 
tion that can be objectively decided, whether 
the principle is necessary for science, I should 
like to submit for judgement by presenting a 
number of elementary and fundamental theorems 
and problems that, in my opinion, could not be 
dealt with at all without the principle of choice. 
In my opinion, Zermelo is right on two counts. First of all, 
he is right that self-evidence is somewhat subjective, but none- 
theless counts for something. In empirical science too, it is 
wrong to think that intuition plays no role at all. It is 
especially noteworthy that what Zermelo characterizes as "object- 
ive" is not the "self-evidencelt of the Axiom of Choice but its 
necessity for science. Today it is not just the Axiom of Choice 
but the whole edifice of modern set theory whose entrenchment 
rests on its great success in mathematical applications -- in 
other words, on "necessity for science". 
The fruitfulness of quasi-empirical methods in mathematics 
is also illustrated by Euler's discovery that 1 + 1/4 + l/9 + . . . 
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= x2/6. His analytical "proof" was in no sense rigorous, but 
confirmation to 30 decimal places made the result indisputable. 
Empirical and probabilistic arguments in the theory of 
numbers are also persuasive. Thus if the "primenes" of 
successive odd numbers is approximately independent, the density 
of prime pairs should be asymptotically approximatley 1/(log nj2. 
Since the integral from one to infinity of l/(log u)~ is infinite, 
there should be an infinite number of prime pairs (p,p + 2). This 
reasoning seems plausible to many mathematicians. 
I suggest that it would be of great value to study such 
quasi-empirical methods systematically, in view of their 
widespread use. 
Coming back to philosophy, I advocate the following very 
simple and elegant formulation of realism: A realist, with 
respect to a given theory or discourse, holds that (1) the 
sentences of that theory or discourse are true or false; and 
(2) that what makes them true or false is something external. 
[After digressing to give some arguments in favor of the 
idea that mathematics is essentially modal rather than exist- 
ential, Professor Putnam returned to two arguments for realism 
in the philosophy of mathematics, in terms of mathematical 
experience and physical experience. The amazing consistency 
of mathematics, in spite of the fact that no finitistic consist- 
ency proof is possible (Gbdel), is most impressive. But would 
mathematics be so consistent if its statements were incapable 
of interpretation? Is not the fertility of mathematics also 
due to its truth under some interpretation? May not realistic 
interpretations provide a basis for both the consistency and 
fertility of mathematics? 
This position seems also to argue against Brouwerian 
intuitionism. In particular, Newton's Law of Universal Gravita- 
tion is intuitionistically false. Actually, Brouwer's Dissert- 
ation takes the point of view that physical objects, other 
people, and even future states of his own mind are all "fictions". 
In closing Putnam commented on the recent view that quantum 
mechanics is a complete realistic theory, that there is nothing 
special about measurement, and that we just happen to live in 
a world that does not obey the laws of Boolean logic. Advocates 
of this new quantum logic only claim that quantum logic is true 
given the precisely specified operational meaning of the logical 
connectives. Mackey and Jauch go so far as to suggest that 
there is some other study, called "logicl' (with no operational 
meaning at all) that they are not challenging. But the fact is 
that, if quantum logic is right, then not only the propositional 
calculus used in physics is affected, but also set theory itself. 
The effect may be that the answer to basic questions about, say, 
the continuum, will come in the future not from new "intuitions" 
alone, but from physical/mathematical discovery.] 
[A more extended account of the ideas expressed here will 
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appear in Prof. Putnam’s forthcoming book Mathematics, Matter, and 
Method, Cambridge University Press, 1975. -- Ed.] 
DISCUSSION 
The discussion began with a consideration of how geometry had 
become combined with algebra. Boyer disputed Putnam’s claim that 
Descartes set up a one-to-one correspondence between points on a 
line and real numbers -- Descartes’ geometry was one of line seg- 
ments but not vice versa. In answer to Putnam’s query concerning 
who first assumed that there was a (real) number for each point on 
the line, Regoczei suggested Cantor, and DieudonnQ proposed Bombelli 
May said that the development of the real number system occured over 
two centuries and that the explicit statement of a one-to-one 
correspondence between points and real numbers came quite late. 
Browder then proposed an alternative explanation to that of 
previous speakers for the unconcern of contemporary mathematicians 
with foundations. In the period 1900-1910 when a number of 
eminent mathematicians were involved with foundations, concern 
centered on the practical question of saving certain fields of 
mathematics, particularly measure theory, which depended heavily 
on Cantorian methods. Browder inferred that the mathematicians’ 
present unconcern with foundations reflected the absence of such 
a pressing need today. Regarding Bishop’s talk, Browder stated 
that Hermann Weyl thought non-constructive methods valuable, 
particularly in mathematical physics, because constructive 
methods restricted the range of problems accessible to research. 
Browder also denied Bishop’s claim of a crisis in contemporary 
mathematics and asserted that most mathematicians would admit 
the existence of such a crisis only from the breakdown or 
inconsistency of present mathematical research. Lastly, Browder 
contended, mathematicians become interested in the meaning of 
their results only as a way of solving a difficult problem. 
Putnam replied that one could be interested in philosophy 
of mathematics not only for such technical reasons, but also as 
an individual with an involvement in his culture, of which 
philosophy is a part. Referring next to Bishop’s talk, Putnam 
said he considered Bishop’s hypothetical reaction of Hilbert 
as capitulation rather than cooperation, because it ignored the 
question of the truth of LPO and the interpretation of the 
connective “or” - - in physics as well as in mathematics. Bishop 
denied that Hilbert would have been capitulating, on the grounds 
that mathematics can be applied to physics only to the extent 
that it is inherently “constructive.” [This seems to be related 
to P.W. Bridgeman’s “operational” view of physics. -- Ed.] 
The remainder of the discussion ranged widely over the relation- 
ship between mathematics, the real world, and the philosophy of 
mathematics. Repeatedly speakers returned to constructivism vs. 
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realism -- as reflected in Bishop's and Putnam's talks. 
Dou regarded it as sometimes necessary to be Platonistic (in 
the sense of admitting a typical existence of mathematical objects) 
in order to explain the applicability of mathematics to the real 
world; indeed, most mathematicians prefer Platonist or formal 
mathematics because it works and is beautiful. He recalled a 
paper (Corn. Pure Appl. Math. 7 (1954), 159-193.) in which P. Lax 
conjectured a theorem because of an "experimentally mathematical 
proof"; but Dou believed that such a proof is much closer to Physics 
than Mathematics. [In connection with this question, see also 
Polya's book [C26]. -- Ed.] Likewise, although many mathematicians 
believe in the existence of mathematical objects, Dou preferred 
Bishop's approach, because the question of Platonic realism falls 
outside of mathematics. Putnam replied that many important 
applications of mathematics are within mathematics, while May made 
the clarification that what Putnam called mathematical experience -- 
perviously created mathematics -- is part of the real world. 
The discussion then turned to the meaning of existence in 
mathematics. Putnam regarded DOU'S mention of the existence of 
mathematical objects as misleading. For Putnam, the important 
question concerned rather the objectivity of mathematics, i.e., 
whether any statement in mathematics is in some way true or 
false. Then Dou asserted that existence has a different meaning 
in mathematics than in physics, a contention which Dreben found 
debatable. 
Crowe asked Putnam how he thought the history of mathematics 
was related to the philosophy of mathematics. Putnam replied 
that he was trying to relate the philosophy of mathematics to 
what mathematicians actually do. 
Turning to other interdisciplinary relations, Freudenthal 
asked whether the ability to place a rocket on the moon was 
produced by good mathematics or good physics. In a similar 
vein, he then inquired whether the inability to name the next 
Vice-President meant that mathematics was bad. Putnam answered 
that the rocket's accuracy certainly indicated the success of 
both mathematics and physics, and that terms such as "operator" 
had the same meaning in both. But the failure to predict the 
next Vice-President concerned political science, not mathematics. 
Moore asked Bishop why he objected to applying mathematics 
to psychology and other fields outside the physical sciences. 
Bishop replied that most mathematics used in psychological, social 
and economic research was phoney and merely decorative. May 
concurred that most mathematical economics was unimportant 
mathematically and useless economically. Finally, Bishop regretted 
the appearance of "applications" to social science in introductory 
calculus texts. 
